BY NATALIE SMITH


Natalie Smith is a second-year M.A. student concentrating in International Law at Johns Hopkins SAIS. With a background as a researcher and strategist at an international anti-trafficking organization, Natalie is interested in understanding the ways in which policy gaps and miscommunications are impeding the protection of forced migrants worldwide.


INTRODUCTION

With the recent calls to elevate the term “climate change” to “climate emergency” by activists and the subsequent affirmative responses from 1,169 jurisdictions in 23 countries,[1] it is evident that the effects of environmental degradation are being taken increasingly seriously by the international community. These declarations of indignation and calls for reform also raise concern about those whose homes and livelihoods have been, or will be, affected by the devastating effects of climate change. Specifically, small island developing states (SIDS) are some of the most at-risk nations, despite their trailblazing commitment to sustainability and environmental protection. These small states often face socioeconomic vulnerabilities similar to other developing countries, with the main distinction being their proximity to the negative effects of climate change. Rising sea levels, an increased frequency of natural disasters, and other gradual-onset issues such as drought and desertification plague countries in the Caribbean, South China Sea, and the Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic Oceans.[2] Climate-induced displacement and internal migration is expected to affect over 140 million people over the next three decades,[3] with many likely needing international assistance. To adequately protect those rendered most vulnerable by the global climate emergency, clearer understandings and distinctions between the different types of climate-induced migration must be made, as well as a rethinking of the international definition of refugee.

COMPLEXITIES IN THE DEFINITION AND PROTECTION OF CLIMATE MIGRANTS

There are multiple complexities involved with defining climate migrants as refugees. First and foremost, even for those crossing national borders to flee natural disaster or other climate-related issues, there is currently no basis for the term “climate refugee” in international law. The 1951 Geneva Convention clearly protects only those who

  1. have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”

  2. are “outside the country of his nationality”; and/or

  3. do not possess any nationality and are “outside the country of his former habitual residence”.[4]

It can be quickly determined that migrants fleeing natural disaster, whether sudden or slowly progressing, do not currently fall under the protections of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Additionally, the vast majority of those who migrate due to climate-related reasons migrate within national borders, arguably placing them outside the scope of the protection of refugee-specific international agencies such as the UNHCR.

Given this lack of prescribed international protection in both the 1951 Geneva Convention and the subsequent 1967 Protocol, it is now important to determine whether there should be protection for those affected by the present climate emergency. Undoubtedly, and as stated by the UNHCR’s Filippo Grandi in a speech to its executive committee last year, climate change is an ever-growing, complicated displacement issue. In addition to being the largest factor influencing internal displacement today, it also has major effects on cross-border displacement levels.[5] Climate change is a complex migratory driver on multiple fronts: it often intersects with other driving factors (such as wars or economic hardship), it affects populations via both sudden, destructive natural disasters and the gradual erosion of economic livelihood (due to rising sea levels and increased drought), and its effects can be attributed to a variety of international actors and natural factors instead of a singular, causal relationship. These complexities, and the magnitude of their impacts, highlight the need to more clearly define the issue.

While amending the 1951 Geneva Convention to include both a definition for, and protection of, climate refugees would be a commendable place to start, developing even a moderate level of consensus would be a difficult task. The needs of potential climate change refugees are notably different (and may often require longer-term commitment to protection and assistance) than those of traditional refugees. Though many displaced by conflict or disaster that fall under the protection of the 1951 Geneva Convention may also face long-term displacement, there is usually at least a possibility of return to their country of origin. Citizens of small island developing states affected by climate change may flee and not have a home to which they can return, creating the additional issue of mass statelessness. Therefore, rather than trying to adapt or modify a convention with a more limited scope, an entirely new convention specifically regarding climate migrants and their rights to protection and assistance may be necessary. Additionally, a distinction between those fleeing natural disaster and those experiencing the more gradual effects of climate change must be made. This determination is arguably the most formidable barrier to progress in the protection of climate migrants.

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SUDDEN ONSET AND GRADUAL CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate migrants are generally grouped into two broad categories: “sudden onset” climate migrants and those migrating due to the gradual effects of climate change. Sudden onset climate migrants are those fleeing a sudden natural disaster that immediately displaces them, destroys assets, erodes infrastructure and renders an area (at least temporarily) uninhabitable. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, an average of 26.4 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced every year by sudden natural disasters.[6] Though this figure cannot be entirely attributed to climate change, the correlation between climate change and the increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters is well-documented.

Conversely, the gradual effects of climate change are more subtle and are often conflated with other development issues. The need for international protection in these cases is much less clear. Instances of migration due to what climate-related issues may occur in the future, while understandable, do not encapsulate what the current international definition of “refugee” represents. Given the (arguably inaccurate) perception that refugees cause long-term economic burdens on host countries, international consensus regarding whether to offer international protection and refugee status to climate migrants may only be feasible if it involves those immediately displaced by natural disasters. These disasters would likely also need to have some sort of traceable correlation to climate change, and be determined to be devastating enough that cross-border relocation is the only option.

For those facing the undeniable, yet more slowly progressing, effects of climate change, increased domestic and international protection is also needed. However, with regard to amending the international definition of “refugee,” it will likely be more difficult to include those not facing an “immediate” threat under that definition. Perhaps the international understanding of the term “immediate” needs to shift. For now, however, there is a greater chance of success in at least extending refugee status to sudden onset climate migrants, with hope that this protection can be further expanded in the future.   

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs) 

Issues of national sovereignty become more evident when addressing the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced climate migrants. While internal displacement is a major issue, it would be far too complex for refugee-focused international institutions to constantly risk infringing upon national sovereignty to provide either emergency aid or long-term protection to those internally displaced due to climate change. It is therefore essential that domestic agencies be formed and strengthened to address the needs of this specific group of IDPs, but currently, the domestic nature of IDPs fundamentally excludes them from the scope of the protection afforded to refugees under the Geneva Convention.

CONCLUSION

While the aforementioned parameters for determining who should receive international protection and assistance as a result of climate change may seem relatively limited, it is important to remember just how many people could fall under the category of “climate refugee” in the next three decades. If even a small percentage of those projected to forcibly migrate were to fall under the definition of a refugee, it could create a significant infrastructural strain on underprepared nations around the world. While international protection should absolutely be extended to those who need it most, parameters need to be clearly defined as quickly as possible. Either an amendment to the 1951 Geneva Convention, or a new convention entirely, should unambiguously outline that those fleeing immediate, eminent danger as a result of a climate-induced natural disaster are eligible for international protection and assistance. With the traditional classification of “refugee”, there is generally some degree of hope of safe return. For those living in small island developing states, there could soon be no home to which migrants could return. If climate change can finally be declared an emergency, then the international community should be prepared to extend protection to those most affected by this emergency it helped to create.


[1] “Climate Emergency Declarations in 1,169 Jurisdictions and Local Governments Cover 290 Million Citizens.” Climate Emergency Declaration, 26 Oct. 2019, https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declarations-cover-15-million-citizens/.

[2] “List of SIDS: Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform.” United Nations Sustainable Goals Knowledge Platform, United Nations, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list.

[3] Turrentine, Jeff. “Climate Change Is Already Driving Mass Migration Around the Globe.” NRDC, 4 Oct. 2019, https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/climate-change-already-driving-mass-migration-around-globe.

[4] “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/statusofrefugees.aspx.

[5] United Nations. “Opening Statement at the 70th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme.” UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/5d9b0ad44/opening-statement-70th-session-executive-committee-high-commissioners-programme.html.

[6] Apap, Joanna. The Concept of 'Climate Refugee' Towards a Possible Definition. European Parliamentary Research Service, Feb. 2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621893/EPRS_BRI(2018)621893_EN.pdf.


PHOTO CREDIT: Free use image from Canva Pro.

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