By Camille Sachs and Rayza Oblitas
Camille Sachs is a first-year student in the International Development program at SAIS and an Editor of SAIS Perspectives.
Rayza Oblitas is a first-year student in the International Development program at SAIS.
The SAIS Development Roundtable and the SAIS Conflict Management Program hosted Nancy Lindborg and Professor Paul R. Miller for a discussion on preventative strategies to fight the root causes of extremism. Ms. Lindborg is the President and CEO of the U.S. Institute of Peace, an independent, nonpartisan, and federally funded institute to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict around the world. Previously, she served as the assistant administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID and led response teams for the crisis in Syria, the droughts in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, the Arab Spring, and the Ebola crisis. Prior to USAID, she was the President of Mercy Corps.
The talk drew largely from the findings of the recent U.S. Institute of Peace report Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach, which was produced by the Task Force on Preventing Extremism in Fragile States earlier this year. The Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States was convened by the U.S. Institute of Peace in response to a request from U.S. Congress in 2018. This report developed a new strategy on preventing the spread of extremism and to support fragile states by drawing on the lessons of previous U.S. counter-extremism action. The Task Force included former policymakers, legislators, and other foreign policy experts.
Ms. Lindborg opened the discussion by emphasizing the importance of encouraging U.S. legislators to work across the aisle to tackle some of the largest challenges of extremism prevention. In her talk, she highlighted three main takeaways from the report – first, there needs to be a shared framework for prevention; second, diplomatic strategy needs to be more connected across security and development; and third, there is a need to build strategic international partnerships between governments and institutions. In particular, there needs to be a recognition of the different time scales in which development and security initiatives take place to avoid disrupting one another’s efforts. For instance, development programs tend to have a long-term, institution-building view, whereas security initiatives are typically shorter and more ad hoc. The report calls for synchronization of programing across these different time frames in order to build effective counter-extremism strategies.
In addition to noting positive steps forward, the report also included analysis on what has historically not been effective in terms of combating extremism. For example, it found that counter-terrorism initiatives derived from Washington, D.C. often fail because of both distance from the targets – largely in the Middle East – as well as poor strategy implementation. Ms. Lindborg emphasized the importance of focusing on broader, locally-led strategies rather than trying to implement U.S.-led strategies abroad.
Additionally, the report calls to ensure that Western security strategies – such as the toppling of autocratic regimes – do not inadvertently contribute to the rise of terrorism in extreme states. These interventions can create power vacuums or allow for weapons to be diverted to extremist groups. Ms. Lindborg argued for a decrease in reliance on military assets as well as increased alignment between development and security efforts to reduce the likelihood of inadvertently promoting extremism. In Afghanistan, there was a lack of coordination across different U.S. interventions. The military was fighting the Taliban, the intelligence officers were tracking Al Qaeda, and the development community was focused on rebuilding the state. A joint study between USIP, Stanford, and Chatham House found that this created a situation in which the security actions undertaken by the military and intelligence community actively undercut state-building action.
Drawing on lessons learned from the report produced by the Institute’s Task Force on Preventing Extremism in Fragile States, Ms. Lindborg discussed the importance of aligning prevention strategies with other intervention programming, creating inclusive institutions, and creating cross-sector understanding around combating extremism.
After the talk, Perspectives sat down with Ms. Lindborg to talk more about the report and its implications for prevention strategy.
Perspectives: The Task Force on Preventing Extremism in Fragile States Report discusses the need for building more accountable and inclusive institutions. What might this process look like in practice? Do you think the international community has a role to play, or is it something that needs to come from within the country? Are there any specific examples where you have seen a successful institution-building processes?
NL: Fundamentally, it needs to be locally led and owned by the people who live and work within those systems. The international community has two roles; on the one hand, it needs not to undermine those initiatives, which can sometimes happen inadvertently. On the other hand, it needs to look for ways to help support more inclusive and accountable institutions. The change in institutions can start at any level. For example, there were two demographically similar communities in southern Tunisia, Sidi Bouzid and Metlaoui. Sidi Bouzid had its mosques taken over by extremists, and a substantial number of fighters went to Syria. Meanwhile, in its neighboring Metlaoui, their mosques were never infiltrated, and they only sent one fighter to Syria. The key difference is that in Metlaoui had a traditional labor union that gave citizens a place to express their concerns and to receive feedback from local officials. Their voices were heard. This is an example at the local level, but sometimes you start locally to prepare the ground for national change.
Perspectives: On the topic of social mobilization, do you think that it is necessary to have governmental stability with a certain level of growth and free speech in order for social mobilization to be effective? Can you see social mobilization working effectively in fragile states?
NL: The task force report did not focus on this; however, USIP has a long line of effort explicitly focused on civic action and research regarding practical skills for successful non-violent social movements. I think that we are in a year of people power, and we are seeing social movements in places that are very repressive, often with people who have low education or who lack secure livelihoods or social standing. These changes are happening now in places like Iran, Sudan, Hong-Kong, Algeria, and Venezuela. Sometimes social mobilization is the only way to get the attention of a government that is either too weak or too repressive to take account of citizens' needs and voice. It is essential to mention that there are a lot of ways for social movements to remain non-violent. The evidence tells us that once social movements turn violent, they are by far less effective.
Perspectives: What is the next step for social movements in fragile states to achieve results? Is there a role to play for international community to support them?
NL: We researched that topic and found that the international community needs to be very careful about directly supporting social movements because international support can delegitimize them. The power of this kind of social movements is that they are led and owned by locals. Let's take the example of Sudan; their social movements had been successful, and now they are in the next phase – building institutions with a new government. In this stage, the international community can support the development of the inclusive institutions that the movement demanded as well as bring political leverage to guarantee the military honors the agreement it subscribed to. The international community can play a useful role in institution building after social movements have achieved success, rather than in supporting the social movements themselves.
Perspectives: The report also points out that US military interventions have, in some cases, contributed to political vacuums or systemic neglect that have allowed for the rise of extremism in fragile states. How can preventative actions work in concert with counterterrorism to prevent this occurrence in the future?
NL: You would use all the instruments – diplomacy, development, and security— upstream of violence and chaos. For example, using the military to do security sector reform in tandem with a prevention strategy that focuses on governance to create more inclusive institutions and citizen engagement.
Perspectives: The Report says that in order to improve extremism prevention efforts, there needs to be more coordination among security, development, humanitarian and diplomatic strategy of US government agencies and donors. What are some ways to improve coordination and streamline prevention efforts?
NL: First of all, you need to have a shared theory of the case. There needs to be an understanding on how to apply all capabilities – security, diplomacy, development, and intelligence – in a cohesive way in order to prevent violent extremism. It is also necessary to loosen some of the bureaucratic constraints that exist. For instance, short-term rigid funding that is largely ineffective because these complicated environments require long-term and iterative engagement for real change to occur. It’s also important to acknowledge that the circumstances in which you started may not be the same circumstances after 3 or 5 years. Thus, it is necessary to have the flexibility and agility to shift according to the context. Sometimes, it happens that we lock down these long-term strategic plans and we are working on an outdated set of assumptions. It is important to recognize that we are working in ever-changing and highly complex environments.
SAIS Perspectives is grateful to Nancy Lindborg for taking the time to speak with us, and to the International Development program for organizing the Development Roundtable. To read about other Development Roundtable events, click here.
PHOTO CREDIT: SAIS Development Roundtable and the SAIS Conflict Management Program.